4.2) U.S Interest

Now, looking from the other side, U.S too wants a 'comprehensive settlement' in the region involving India, Pakistan, Kashmir and may be some more with its own interest and ultimate objectives in mind. U.S interest is not Kashmir as such; it has basically strategic interests in the wider Asian region. U.S interest demands a strong, 'stable' and market-democratic India and the whole purpose of a comprehensive settlement for U.S is to formalise some kind of a regional security structure in the South Asian region in which the existing power realities in the region are formalised giving India predominance in the region and legitimatizing Pakistan's subservience; the 'instability' factors -- Kashmir on top of them -- are neutralised, enabling India to 'rise above' subcontinental security preoccupations and play a 'useful' role in the BoP regime in Asia. There is already some talk of such a 'settlement' making rounds in some responsible quarters in U.S strategic community. Reports appearing in Indian and Pakistani press say that Dr Stephen Cohen, an informal consultant to U.S State Dept. has circulated a 'blue-print' for a South Asian Camp David plan among very responsible and influential Congressional circles in U.S.106 We should, however, evaluate the prospect of such a 'settlement' not on the basis of Cohen proposals or the denials of it by other responsible U.S officials,107 but on the basis of the strategic logic of the evolving international system in Asia (cf.1.3). This system cannot evolve and become functional, without such a 'settlement' being worked out in the first place. The reason:

It was basically in 1947, that an India-dominated political order was established in South Asia. Since then things have changed in India's favour. India has added to its power and it has no serious challenges left to its position in the immediate region. India is thus 'in a unique position amongst large Asian powers since all of the others potentially confront serious challenges to their regional positions.108 On the one hand India is really in a dominating position, but on the other almost all its neighbours are scared of its hegemonic intentions and, therefore, not ready to accept its leadership. Pakistan has openly challenged it. This is seen by the strategic community as 'weakening of the 'natural' regional security structure in South Asia.109 A 'natural' structure was established by the British with India in the leadership position and everyone else expected to accept this leadership, but it has not worked. So the 'natural' arrangement needs to be formalised now. Here comes the need of a 'comprehensive settlement' talked about above. What will be the form of this 'comprehensive settlement' or the South Asian 'Camp David' is too early to say. However, a few general but important points can be made on the basis of some facts.

• (a) It was during U.S defence secretary William Perry's visit last year (cf.1.4.4.1) that the then Indian PM Rao in a meeting with the former agreed to the offer of U.S playing a role in the 'solution of Kashmir issue.'110 The offer having come at Perry's visit and that being accepted by India, suggests strategic-security considerations to be the main element in U.S South Asia moves.
• (b) The U.S Kashmir activism has been widely noticed in the recent days mainly with reference to U.S Ambassador to India Frank Wisner's 'shuttle diplomacy' -- frequent air jaunts to Islamabad, Srinagar and top level discussions with all 'concerned' everywhere. One can argue that why the U.S ambassador in India and not the one in Pakistan or for that matter any 'neutral' U.S diplomat has been entrusted with the Kashmir task. The answer may perhaps lie in the fact that U.S South Asia moves are India-centred.
• (c) The US Institute of Peace (USIP)--- a think tank of the U.S State Dept.--- has been holding some regular annual meetings about Kashmir. In its Jan 1994 meeting, the concept paper circulated, categorically stated that the 'resolution of the conflict in Kashmir could be attempted only within the existing political framework of the subcontinent.'111 and this according to an Indian participant in the meeting 'lent an air of reality to the discussions.'112 This gives some indication that Kashmir's secession from India is ruled out in U.S South Asia plans, which in turn points to the fact that in these plans India's 'stability' is being taken well care of.

India needs a 'comprehensive settlement' as opposed to an ad hoc agreement; U.S is also looking for a comprehensive settlement as part of its overall strategic planning for Asia. This creates a sort of Indo-U.S convergence. Indo-U.S co-operation on Kashmir, for example, U.S support to India for the proposed 'assembly elections' in Kashmir should be seen against the backdrop of this convergence. A U.S South Asia/Kashmir move which apparently looks pro-India should not be merely viewed as such; it may be helping India but at the same time it may be necessitated by the wider U.S strategic outlook for Asia.